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Much of the growth in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past decade has come from extractive industries, 
rather than from private, entrepreneurial activity.  Furthermore, non-extractive activity in the private 
sector is often dominated by firms owned by ethnic minorities.  This paper analyzes the 
characteristics of the formal private sector in five countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular 
emphasis on Black African-owned (indigenous) firms.  We find that indigenous firms start smaller 
and grow more slowly; however their rate of growth is positively influenced by whether the owner-
entrepreneur has a university degree.  We do not find overwhelming evidence that credit is the 
binding constraint but we do find that indigenous firms get less access to trade credit than firms 
owned by minority entrepreneurs. Finally, we discuss policy solutions that might enable a larger 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Much of the discourse on economic development and the private sector has focused on 
the role of foreign direct investment.  While it is clear that foreign investment can play an 
important role in generating growth, it is also increasingly evident that countries cannot 
grow without a vibrant, domestic private sector. Ultimately, it is not foreign aid but rather 
privately generated profits which are the source of economic growth and poverty 
alleviation.  In this paper, we will analyze the constraints faced by domestic firms in five 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Senegal, and Benin--with a 
view to identifying policy solutions that will help indigenous entrepreneurs to enter and 
survive in the private sector. 
 
Several similarities exist across the countries in our sample.  All have a history of 
colonization by European countries, and all have pursued post-independence 
industrialization strategies that focused on import-substituting industrialization and the 
creation of a large state-owned sector.  This in turn led to the emergence of  inefficient, 
dualistic manufacturing sectors, where a large number of informal and small firms 
coexisted with some relatively large capital intensive firms.  All countries adopted World 
Bank-initiated structural adjustment programs in the 1980s or 1990s to reform their 
economies and pursue outward oriented growth.  However, their manufacturing sectors  
remain small and fragmented—the majority of manufacturing remains under the control 
of either the state or minority ethnic groups, which account for much of the non-
extractive employment generation in the private sector.  Understanding why Black-
owned firms in the formal private sector tend to be few and small is important because 
further broad-based growth of manufacturing can only occur with the participation of 
domestic firms, including the indigenous majority. 
 
 
Indigenous and Minority-Owned Firms in the Formal Private Sector  
 
This analysis is based on data obtained from the World Bank’s Investment Climate 
Enterprise Surveys.  These surveys are conducted by door-to-door visits to firms, and 
cover the manufacturing sector for all countries as well as other sectors such as services, 
tourism etc.  Using a stratified, random sample of firms in each country, the surveys  
focus on gathering information for the measurement of firm-level productivity and the 
characteristics of the investment climate in which firms operate.  A standardized core 
questionnaire used in all countries which enables benchmarking on the crucial variables 
of investment, employment growth and productivity.  The data used covers the formal 
sector only and looks at ownership in this sub-sector of the economy.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the informal sector is almost entirely made up on indigenous 
actors, but this sector is not the subject of this analysis. Forthcoming research will focus 
on the characteristics of the informal sector in Africa. 
 
In this analysis, we use the investment climate survey data for five African countries 
(Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Senegal and Benin), all of which were surveyed during the   3
period 2002-04.  Using these data, we aim to identify key characteristics of the 
indigenous entrepreneur-owned firms in the formal private sector, in contrast to other 
types of firms.   
 
We begin by looking at the size distribution of firms in our sample (Figure 1).  It is clear 
that the vast majority of firms in Africa are small (between 10 and 49 workers) as 
opposed to medium-sized (between 50 and 199 workers) or large (over 200 workers) .    
 













































Further differences are revealed when we disaggreate domestic entrepreneur-owned firms 
by ethnicity of the owner. Figure 2 shows the average firm size of an indigenously-owned 
firm vs. a firm owned by an entrepreneur from a minority ethnic group (i.e. of Asian, 
Middle Eastern or Caucasian descent).  We see that indigenous-owned firms are the 
smaller—most are well below 50 workers—whereas minority ethnic owned firms are 
substantially larger in all the countries reported in Figure 2.
1   
 
                                                 
1 We do not look at the informal sector in this paper, that is the subject of forthcoming work. A first look at 
the data suggests that this sector is dominated by indigenously-owned firms.  The question that we will 
examine is—why don’t more of these firms cross over to the formal sector?   4
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Figure 3 shows that indigenous-owned firms enter the market at a significantly smaller 
size than minority ethnic-owned firms.  While the average firm size at startup of 
minority-owned firms in Tanzania is about 100 employees, that number is just under 40 
employees for an indigenously-owned firm.  For most countries where we have these 
data, the difference in startup size is close to 50 percent. 
 
Figure 3:  Entry-level Size of Indigenous and Minority-Ethnic Owned Firms 
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Figure 4 sums up the differences in current size, aggregating across all minority groups.   
We see that the difference in startup size persists over time, the difference in size at time 
of survey is not much different than the difference in size at startup and that in many 
cases, a large gap emerges over time between indigenous and minority entrepreneurs.   5
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Our data show that minority-owned firms start operations at a significantly larger size 
than indigenous African-owned firms.  But the data also show that not all indigenous 
entrepreneurs start small.  Further disaggregation of indigenously-owned firms shows 
that for indigenous entrepreneurs, education is very important in determining the size at 
which they start operations.  Indigenous entrepreneurs with a university education start 
much larger firms compared to those that do not have a university degree in all countries 
surveyed, as described in Figure 5.
2  
 
                                                 
2 There are other analyses of the role of ethnicity in the private sector in Africa. Most notable is that a study 
by Taye Mengistae which  looks at the role of ethnicity in the indigenous private sector in Ethiopia 
(Mengistae, 2001).  More recently, Marcel Fafchamps examines the dynamics of the private sector, 
including the role of ethnicity, in a comprehensive analysis of markets in sub-Saharan Africa (Fafchamps, 
2004).      6
Figure 5: Entry-level Firm Size vs. Attainment of University Education 
 



























































Figure 6 shows that the difference in size persists over time in most countries.  Size at the 
time of survey is also higher for indigenous entrepreneurs with attainment of a university 
education than for those without such an education. 
 
Figure 6:  Current Firm Size vs. Attainment of University Education 
 











































   7
Summing up the data above, Tables 1-3  describe key firm characteristics by region.  
Table 1 describes the size of firm at the start of operations, current size of firm, and age 
of firm, disaggregated by ethnicity of owner-entrepreneur (the figures in parentheses are 
standard errors).  We see that in East Africa, minority ethnic-owned firms are over twice 
as large at start-up and that this gap widens over time; these firms are on average, 2.6 
times the size of indigenous firms at the time of survey.  Minority ethnic owned firms are 
also older (20.4 years vs. 11.8 years), which may reflect a greater ability to survive 
shocks, among other things.  A similar pattern holds for West Africa.  Firms in this 
region are in general, smaller and younger than firms in East Africa.  But here too, 
indigenous firms are half as big as minority-ethnic owned firms.  The gap widens much 
more over time, minority firms are over five times as large as indigenous firms at time of 
survey.  Interestingly, there is not much difference in age of firm, just in the rate at which 
they grow over time. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Indigenous vs. Non-indigenous Entrepreneurs 






















































Table 2 describes firm size by whether or not the owner-entrepreneur has a university 
degree.  We see that indigenous entrepreneurs with a university education have firms that 
start larger and stay larger.  This is true in both East and West Africa.  Indigenous 
entrepreneurs in East Africa who have a university education are starting firms that are on 
average, five times larger than those where the entrepreneur does not have a university 
degree.  And the advantage is maintained over time, current size of firms owned by a 
university-educated entrepreneur is three times as large as firms where the entrepreneur 
does not have a university degree.  Interestingly, the gap is much smaller for minority-
owned firms; not being university-educated is less of a disadvantage for this group when 
it comes to starting and growing a firm.  There are two possible interpretations of the 
result regarding the impact of university education—that the completion of a university 
degree reflects a higher ability that is also responsible for entrepreneurial success and/or 
that the university degree enables access to a network of other business professionals that 
is useful for the success of the business.  The difference in the results for minority vs. 
indigenous entrepreneurs implies that the network effect may be significant; further 
research to investigate the network effects of a university education or other types of 
training will be carried out to explore this result fully.   8
Table 2: Firm Size by University Education in East Africa 
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Table 3 describes the results for firms in West Africa. We again see that indigenous 
entrepreneurs with a university degree are at an advantage.  However, in contrast to East 
Africa, this advantage seems to hold for non-indigenous firms as well—these are twice as 
big when the entrepreneur is university-educated. 
 
Table 3:  Firm Size by University Education in West Africa 






















































Building on these results, we formulate a simple econometric model that enables us to 
test hypotheses regarding the determinants of start-up size and firm growth.  Our cross-
sectional data do not allow us at this stage to develop an identification strategy that would 
lead to conclusive results on causality.   But we can look at correlations between firm 
growth and variables such as age, size, and educational attainment.  We can do this for 
the entire sample as well as for indigenous and non-indigenous firms separately.  In 
particular, we look at two key variables--access to finance and attainment of a university 
degree--to see if these are correlated with start-up size and rate of growth.  The results of 
this exercise are presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
The first regression looks at the determinants of start-up size for the whole sample; the 
next two regressions separate out indigenous and non-indigenous firms (Tables 4 and 5).    9
We see that whether or not an entrepreneur has a university education is significant in 
determining start-up size, as is his/her access to a formal loan. However, upon 
disaggregating the sample, we see that these variables are only significant for indigenous 
firms.  The econometric model as a whole is not significant for non-indigenous firms, 
indicating that startup size is driven by other factors.   We get similar results for West 
Africa; university education is significant for indigenous entrepreneurs but not others in 
determining startup size.  Access to finance is not significant.  We do see that Gibrat’s 
Law holds—firms that are older and bigger at start grow more slowly.  Both university 
education and access to a loan at start-up are also significant for the whole sample.   
 
University education is significant for indigenous entrepreneurs in both East and West 
Africa, upon disaggregating the sample, and formal loans help only non-indigenous 
entrepreneurs in East Africa.  The variable that is consistently significant throughout 
these estimations is university education, which helps indigenous firms grow at a higher 
rate in both East and West Africa.   
 
Table 4: Estimation of Startup Size in Africa 






























































































































    













0.20 0.05  0.17 
 
0.17 0.05 
Note: Only the subset of entrepreneur-owned firms is used in these estimations.  Coefficients on sector 
dummies are not reported in the table.   10
Table 5: Estimation of Firm Growth  













































































































































   












0.38 0.53 0.44 0.41 0.53 
 
Note: Only the subset of entrepreneur-owned firms is used in these estimations.  Coefficients on sector 
dummies are not reported in the table. 
 
These results show that indigenous firms start smaller and grow more slowly but that 
attainment of a university education is significant in driving growth for this type of firm.  
This result has been obtained in prior analyses of firm growth, carried out with data from 
the 1990s (Ramachandran and Shah, 1999).  One possible explanation is that a university 
education imparts much-needed skills to operate and grow a business and to survive 
exogenous shocks.  The more likely explanation is that a university education provides 
access to a network of business professionals that in turn enables access to knowledge, 
capital and other inputs that are necessary to firm survival and growth.   
   11
Access to Credit, Cost of Credit and Reasons for Not Applying for Credit 
 
Another important aspect of the investment climate is the scope of the financial market—
in particular, access to credit, cost of credit, and why firms do not apply for credit.  The 
use of the formal financial differs quite a bit across countries—firms in Tanzania and 
Senegal have deeper financial systems and greater access to finance than firms elsewhere 
in Africa (Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran, 2005).  The average cost of a loan in Africa is 
higher than in India, China, and Morocco—in some cases, interest rates are over 20 
percent.  Collateral requirements are also quite significantly over 100 percent of the loan 
for several countries in Africa. In many cases, collateral is restricted to land in the capital 
city or to overseas real estate (such as an apartment in London or Paris), which could be 
readily seized in the event of non-payment. 
 
Table 6 shows the percentage of firms with trade credit, overdrafts or loans and the 
percentage that applied and were rejected.
3  We see that about two-thirds of firms have 
trade credit in most countries, while the percentage of firms with overdrafts varies a great 
deal, ranging from just over 20 percent to over 63 percent in Kenya.  The percentage of 
firms that currently have a loan also varies quite a bit, with Senegal having the highest 
percentage and Tanzania the lowest.  Finally the percentage of firms that applied for a 
loan and were rejected is about 6 percent across the board. Table 7 disaggregates these 
data by ethnicity. 
 
Table 6:  Trade Credit, Overdrafts, Loans  
 









with  loan 
Applied and 
got Rejected 
Kenya  79.2  62.6  32.7  5.6% 
Uganda 59.1  22.6  19.9  5.8% 
Tanzania  62.8  31.4  19.5  -- 
Senegal 66.4  56.3  38.3  6.8% 
Benin 57.1  23.4 24.5     
 
                                                 
3 Rejection data are for current applicants only.   12
 
Table 7:  Trade Credit, Overdrafts and Loans by Ethnicity 
  % with Trade Credit  % with Overdrafts  % with Loans 
  Indigenous  Minorities Indigenous Minorities Indigenous  Minorities
Kenya  77.4  79.5 74.2  61.3 41.9  31.6 
Uganda  50.8  71.0  12.9  37.2  13.4  29.8 
Tanzania  50.8  71.1 21.4  39.6 31.3  62.3 
Senegal  63.6  64.9  49.5  64.5  32.5  49.3 
Note: The ethnicity question was not asked in Zambia. For Benin, there were less than 10 non-African 
owned firms.  The number of indigenous African firms in Kenya is very small because the sample was 
constrained to firms with over 10 workers. 
 
Table 8 shows the interest rate on overdrafts and loans, the duration of loans and the 
collateral to loan value.  We see that interest rates on overdrafts are similar to that of 
loans.  We also see that there is a fair bit of dispersion in interest rates across countries.  
However, the duration of loans that firms receive is very similar across countries.   The 
collateral to loan ratio is much higher in Kenya and Zambia, compared to other countries.  
Table 9 shows this data disaggregated by ethnicity of the firm owner. 
 
Table 8: Interest Rate, Duration of Loan and Collateral Requirements 











Kenya  16.0 15.0 3.7  178.3 
Uganda  17.0 16.7 3.7  120.7 
Tanzania  12.5 13.0 3.3  109.7 
Senegal  13.0 11.0 10.0 107 
Benin  8.0 13.0  3.2 120 
 
 
Table 9: Interest Rate, Duration of Loan and Collateral Requirements by Ethnicity 
  Interest rate on 
overdrafts 
Interest rate on 
loans 
Average duration of 
loans 
Collateral to loan 
percentage 
  Indig.  Minorities  Indig.   Minorities Indig.   Minorities  Indig.  Minorities
Kenya  19.0  16.0 16.5  15.0 3.0  3.0  150.0  146.5 
Uganda  18.0  17.5  19.0  16.3  1.0  3.5  --  -- 
Tanzania  14.0  12.5 14.5  12.0 -- --  100.0  100.0 
Senegal  12.0  11.5 12.0  10.5 -- --  100.0  100.0 
 
 
All of this leads to an important question--are indigenous firms credit-constrained?  This 
is a hotly debated topic and we are far from answering the question conclusively in this 
paper.  But the evidence in support of the proposition is at best, mixed.  It is certainly the 
case in our data that interest rates are high, but this does not address the question of 
whether firms that want to invest and grow are actually able to do so.  Or whether firms   13
that want to end up at a certain size or sales volume are constrained by lack of finance 
from being able to get there.
4   This question will continue to be debated but the 
substantial amount of work by Francis Teal on firm survey data for Ghana seems to 
suggest that credit is not a binding constraint (Teal, 1998).   
 
Our data do not present overwhelming evidence of a credit constraint.  The 6 percent 
rejection rate on loan applications does not indicate that firms are being denied credit 
across the board.  Table 10 presents data on the reasons why firms did not apply for a 
loan. The percent of firms that do not approach the banking sector varies a great deal 
across countries; it is as small as 16 percent in Mauritius and as high as 63 percent in 
Tanzania. The reasons for not applying for a loan varies across countries as well. In India, 
the main reason firms give is that they do not need credit. In Tanzania, many firms 
complain about insufficient collateral or that the interest rate is too high. In Uganda, firms 
do not apply for loan because the interest rate is too high and they do not want to incur 
debt.   From these data, it is not clear that firms ar credit-constrained; but some do appear 
to be deterred from entering the financial market.    
 
Tables 11 and 12 show these data broken down by ethnicity; indigenous entrepreneurs 
are more likely to cite insufficient collateral as a reason for not applying for a loan than 
minority ethnic entrepreneurs.
5  Minority firms are more likely to say that they do not 
need credit and a higher percentage of these firms do not apply for a loan; this is 
consistent with the widely held view that minority firms have their own internal networks 
of credit and rely less on the formal banking system.  Indigenous firms are more likely to 
complain about the rate of interest; fewer of them state that they do not need a loan.  But 
again, the evidence is not overwhelming that credit is the binding constraint. 
 
Table 10:  Reasons for Not Applying for a Loan
6



















Kenya  36.6  6.7  15.4  1.0  42.3  1.9  19.2  2.9 
Uganda  58.7  10.2 20.5 14.8 18.8 6.2  17.6 0.6 
Tanzania  63.3  50.0  27.4  41.0  28.5  16.1  61.7  8.0 
Senegal  31.3  20.0 31.2 8.8  21.3 3.8  11.3 1.3 
Benin  46.2  11.0 30.8 24.2 --  1.1  20.9 3.3 
 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to Francis Teal for an e-mail exchange on this subject. 
5 The data for Tanzania are not reported here because multiple responses were allowed.  About the same 
share of firms (60 percent) in Tanzania reported that they did not apply for a loan this past year, across 
ethnic groups. 
6 Note: The question was not asked for Zambia and multiple answers were permitted for Tanzania and 
India.  The answers are tabulated only for firms which answered why they were not applying for a loan, 
which is a subset of the total number of firms that did not apply for a loan. 
 
   14
Table 11:  Indigenous Entrepreneurs’ Reasons for Not Applying for a Loan  



















Kenya  22.0  3.2  6.4  --  3.2  --  9.7  -- 
Uganda  65.9  8.4 12.8  12.3  7.8 3.3 13.4  0.6 
Senegal    20.4 29.6 13.6 13.6 6.8  13.6 2.3 
 
 
Table 12: Minority Entrepreneurs’ Reasons for Not Applying for a Loan 



















Kenya  49.8  2.4  5.5  0.4  17.0  0.8  6.7  1.2 
Uganda  50.5  2.5 10.7  3.3 15.7  4.1 5.8 -- 
Senegal  35.5  13.6 40.9 --  31.8 --  13.6 -- 
 
 
One could argue that the question on whether firms are credit-constrained remains 
unresolved because the data do not account for the problem of selection.  One possible 
reason that indignenous firms do not face markedly different interest rates is that that 
those who did face higher interest rates or rejection rates have exited from the market or 
never entered in the first place.  We do not observe entry and exit in our cross-sectional 
data and therefore cannot look at this particular question at this time; the assembly of 
panel data may enable us to investigate this aspect of the credit story at a future point in 
time.   
 
The story on access to finance is clearer in the area of trade credit which is a component 
of working capital.  We now turn to the question of access to credit across indigenous vs. 
minority ethnic entrepreneurs.  Figure 7 shows that in four African countries, a larger 
percentage of minority-owned firms use trade credit compared to indigenous African 
firms. 
  
Figure 7:  Firms Receiving Trade Credit, by Ethnicity 




























Indigenous Minorities  15
Figures 8 and 9 rely on data collected in the 1990s to show that the indigenous receiving 
trade credit have had a much longer relationship with their suppliers than have minority-
owned firms in East Africa.  A detailed exploration of the issue of trade credit shows that 




























Minorities using credit Minorities using cash
 
 
It is also interesting to note that for minority-owned firms, the length of relationship with 
the supplier does not make much difference. There number of years  dealing with 
suppliers has no bearing on access to credit relative to using cash for transactions, in 
sharp contract to the situation for indigenous firms. 
 
Econometric analysis shows that for small and medium firms owned by minorities,  the 
only variable affecting access to trade credit is firm size, and the magnitude of its 
importance is much smaller than for indigenous firms (Biggs and Shah, 2004). The 
authors argue that members of ethnic networks do not have to rely on establishing long-
                                                 
7 The data for Figures 10 and 11 are from the 1990s surveys conducted by the World Bank in Africa; this 



















Indig  . using cash Indig. using credit  16
term relationships with suppliers to get credit, as their reputation in the network provides 
enough information to lenders. It also indicates that even smaller firms in the business 
network get access to credit.   
 
For indigenous firms, firm size is very important in determining trade credit access, as is 
the length of relationship with supplier. In the absence of good information on indigenous  
firms, suppliers use size as a proxy for information.  Thus, only larger firms get credit. 
Smaller indigenous firms have to establish long-term relationships with each supplier to 
get credit. There is coordination failure in the indigenous African business community 
that prevents firms from developing an informal credit information system analogous to 
the ethnic minority business community.    
 
The results discussed above are in large part, due to the absence of networks in the 
indigenous community.  This leads, among other things, to a paucity of information, 
thereby preventing small, indigenous-owned firms from accessing capital or knowledge 
that would enable them to grow and prosper.  This problem is compounded by the lack of 
enforceabilty of contracts and the weakness of the judicial system.  It is not the lack of 
capital per se, but more likely the lack of availability of  information, that is slowing the 
growth of the African private sector. 
8
 
The results presented in this paper are preliminary, based on a sample of only five 
countries.  Further, in-depth research is needed to really understand the size and ethinc 
distribution of the private sector and inter-country variances in the observed patterns; new 
data from the Investment Climate surveys will enable us to investigate these issues in 
greater detail.  Our preliminary analysis indicates that sub-Saharan Africa is yet to have a 
broad-based manufacturing sector, with indigenous firms in every size class.  The 
constraints identified thus far show that there are some aspects of the investment climate 
that impact all investors, and others such as a lack of educational attainment or access to 
trade credit that impact smaller firms and/or indigenous entrepreneurs to a greater extent.   
The next section discusses the scope of some specific interventions that might address 
these constraints.   The discussion of individual projects in this section is by no means a 
comprehensive summary of the interventions currently underway, but rather, is 




                                                 
8 We realize that information is not the only issue that is relevant with regard to networks.  It may also be 
the case that existing networks use their cohesiveness to engage in price-fixing or othe collusive behavior 
and/or be more effective at paying bribes or “getting around the system.”  This type of behavior will 
compound the problem of lack of information and put indigenous firms at an even greater advantage.  If 
indigenous firms are able to create their own network, this may mitigate the problem by introducing 
competition; competing networks may reduce the ability of any single network to dominate the private 
sector.   17
The Political Economy of Reform 
 
We now turn to the political economy issues surrounding private sector reform.  In many 
countries in Africa, governments have created business environments in which minority-
owned firms have been able to survive and grow faster than indigenous firms.  This may 
be a side effect of poorly-formulated and misguided policies but may also be a result of 
the underlying structure of incentives. The disparity between minority and indigenous 
entrepreneurs persists despite the millions of dollars in support programs to the private 
sector.  Data from firm surveys done in the 1990s indicate that the problems we observe 
in our analysis of data gathered in the present decade have also existed in the previous 
one (Biggs, Shah and Srivastava, 1995).   
 
Some scholars of Africa argue that it is convenient to have a private sector that is 
dominated by ethnic minorities who do not pose a significant threat to political power and 
often provide a steady stream of rents.  Tangri argues that the minority Asian community 
in East Africa, which has thrived even in difficult times, often coexists with a small, 
wealthy, indigenous private sector, and  both are closely aligned with the president or his 
associates (Tangri, 1999). This group relies on its political connections and its rent-
sharing arrangements with the government for its survival.  The government in turn relies 
upon it for extra-budgetary revenues.  Other scholars reinforce this perspective, arguing 
that the political elite in Africa have found mechanisms by which to preserve rent-
seeking arrangements with the sustenance of a small private sector enclave.  When faced 
with donor-driven reforms, governments have often reacted by accomplishing partial 
reform, thereby satisfying the donors while preserving the arrangements of rent-seeking 
(van de Walle, 2001).  Therefore, there has not been much change in the structure or 
competitiveness of the private sector; reforms have often increased the levels of 
uncertainty for the business community more than anything else. 
 
In his analysis of the political economy of reform, James Emery notes that the “overall 
complexity places a premium on means of circumventing, or speeding up the process, 
which creates a flourishing environment for corruption.”  Emery argues that most 
businesses in Africa are operating outside the law in at least one or more aspects and are 
vulnerable to government inspectors, no matter how minor the deviance. The survival of 
a business is consequently heavily dependent on a personal relationship with a minister or 
other high government official, which is often difficult to document or quantify. These 
relationships are crucial to firms that need to anticipate ad hoc policy or regulatory 
changes—a major concern of business as shown in the investment climate surveys.  
Emery concludes that “this vulnerability, combined with the arbitrary nature of 
enforcement arising from poor governance means that firms can be closed down or worse 
for operating in exactly the same way as their neighbors, their competitors, or their clients 
and suppliers” (Emery, 2003). 
 
Following Emery’s analysis, one has to consider the difficult problem of dismantling 
some of the key control points that some governments continue to maintain, which are 
used to penalize firms which represent a political threat.  While the situation on the 
ground is changing and sometimes quite quickly, what governments still seem to fear the   18
most is a private sector which generates wealth independent of government controls, and 
which makes its own, unfettered, decisions.   
 
It is worth pointing out that in some cases, the unease on the part of government officials 
exists on purely economic grounds, arising from very real concerns about protectionism 
in developed country markets, lack of domestic demand, and the ad hoc changes in donor 
priorities.  In other cases, it is the uncertainty that arises from lack of control over the 
generation of wealth, particularly where the private sector is dominated by a few players.  
Despite decades of donor advice, it is still relatively difficult to find policymakers who 
really trust markets to deliver results; given the choice, a regulatory or administrative 
solution is often preferred.  One example is the current discussion on competition policy, 
which some policymakers interpret to mean justifying interventions to make up for lack 
of competition, not measures to increase competition itself, as this prevents their ability 
to decide who the winners are.
9  Another disincentive to reduce controls arises from the 
fact that a more competitive playing field might result in higly visible gains by business 
owners from ethnic minority groups.  This in turn makes it easier for opponents and the 
press to attack government leaders responsible for their “open competition” policies.
10   
 
The key question that arises from these concerns is—how can governments be convinced 
that a broad-based, relatively unfettered private sector is in their interest?  And that 
drastic measures to curb the rights of minority entrepreneurs will not result in viable 
opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs?  Available evidence on the private sector  
shows for that for the most part, reforms to promote private sector development have led, 
atleast in the early stages, to a proliferation of small and medium firms in countries such 
as Taiwan, Malaysia etc.  These firms are hardly a challenge to political power; in fact, 
they are probably less likely to lead to political problems than the current system in 
which governments foster the rise of a small, wealthy class of tycoons and/or the 
continued dominance of a minority ethnic group.  Another way to address government 
unease is to chip away at the edges, focusing on reforms that are less politically difficult 
and which pave the way for future, bigger efforts.   Whatever the path, it is 
overwhelmingly clear that we need to focus on building political will towards private 
sector reform, rather than on technical solutions alone.   
 
On a more positive note, it is important to note that things are changing with the 
emergence of democratic governments and stronger institutions in several African 
countries.  One promising example of reform within Africa is Senegal which has 
significantly lower costs of doing business relative to other countries in the region (Eifert, 
Gelb and Ramachandran, 2005).  The Senegalese case needs to be explored in further 
detail, with a focus on understanding the political incentives for reform and the process of 
                                                 
9 One example is the Commercial Bank of Ghana, which has been pledged to be privatized no less than 
three times as part of IDA credit operations in the past 15 years, but this is yet to be accomplished. 
 
10 Ongoing research suggests that the lobbying behavior of firms reflects the overall state of business-
government relations in sub-Saharan Africa (Ramachandran, Shah, and Tata, 2007, forthcoming).  African 
firms lobby politicians in order to maintain market share, in contrast to lobbying behavior in Asia where 
market share is not a significant determinant of lobbying behavior. 
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implementation.  Even in East Africa, where ethnic minorities have dominated the private 
sector for a long time, anecdotal evidence suggests that more indigenous entrepreneurs 
are entering the private sector and are running very profitable businesses. 
 
The most recent Doing Business report from the World Bank highlights several countries 
in Africa that have reformed their regulatory regimes and lowered the time and cost to 
register a business (Doing Business, 2007); again, it would be useful to understand the 
political dynamic behind these efforts.  Finally, we cannot underestimate the power of 
individual efforts—one example is that of Justice James Ogoola, who has championed a 
highly effective commercial court structure in Uganda, which relies on pushing routine 
disputes into mediation and getting settlements in a matter of days, rather than months or 
years.  Individual entrepreneurs are playing a role in shaping their country’s policies and 
in so doing, are also changing attitudes towards entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Can Africa learn from India’s experience with private sector reforms?  This is a question 
that one often hears, given India’s past policies of protection and its current visibility and 
rising success.  While there is no doubt that India’s reform processes have a long way to 
go (and are sometimes overrated), there are likely some lessons, particularly on the 
political economy front.  How did India reduce the regulatory burden on the private 
sector?  What are the underlying forces that have transformed, and are continuing to 
transform, political will and attitudes toward the private sector?  While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to go into detail on this topic, the emerging literature on India’s 
reforms point to three things—the demonstration effect of India’s success in the high-tech 
sector, the emergence of “MBA politicians” who are focused on improving the 
productivity of the private sector, and the realization that public revenues generated from 
higher rates of economic growth may well be more beneficial than fluctuating rents.  It is 
well within the capabilities of several countries in Africa to replicate some features of the 
Indian success story--call centers, back-office processing firms in Ghana and South 
Africa, and high tech firms in Madagascar and Mauritius are all emerging as strong 
competitors in the international arena.  These and other firms will need the support of 
their governments and a business environment that will provide a reliable supply of 
power and water and a transparent system of taxation and regulation. 
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Building Networks 
 
Our analysis indicates that the “network effect” within minority ethnic groups may be 
significant.  This may be the case because information flows and contract enforceability 
are weak in much of sub-Saharan Africa.  Minority entrepreneurs within a network have 
a much greater incentive to stick to their contractual boundaries as members of the 
network will enforce contracts and/or inflict penalties for violations.  Indigenous 
entrepreneurs who are not operating within a network are not bound by these types of 
enforcement mechanisms nor are they able to generate enough credible information to 
enable them to access trade credit or other resources.  Also, members of the network have 
detailed knowledge of each others firms and of the characteristics of the managers; this 
enables a positive flow of credit, technology and other resources, on terms that are 
unavailable to firms outside th network. 
 
Rather than penalizing ethnic minority groups to promote indigenous entrepreneurs (as 
some populist governments have done in the past, with disastrous results), efforts must be 
made to improve information flows and/or create alternative, competing networks.  Our 
data show that university education is significant in determining the performance and rate 
of growth of indigenous firms.  This result may reflect entry into a network of business 
professionals that serves as an alternative to ethnic minority networks.  It may include 
enabling the flow of information—about firm performance, characteristics of the 
entrepreneur and other vital data that enable lending, the supply of trade credit and the 
transfer of technological knowhow.  If this is the case, it points to the need for more 
business education, whether it be in the form of formal business schools or vocational 
training which is directly related to firm-specific skill formation.  It might also be in the 
form of more informal skill-building workshops or entrepreneurial “boot camps.”   
 
A partnership between the World Bank’s Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Project 
(MSME) and the International Finance Corporation’s Global Business School Network 
(GBSN) to improve the quality of business education began in early 2004 with a project 
in Kenya; the partnership has since grown to projects in four East African countries.  The 
project in Kenya is supporting a case writing program to three universities with a 
particular focus on the needs of MSMEs.  This project will develop the capacity to create 
and use cases for the training of business students and small firms in East Africa.   
GBSN is also working with the Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE) at Addis 
Ababa University in Ethiopia to design solutions relevant to their business environment. 
GBSN has linked local faculty with international mentors to upgrade curriculum, while 
enhancing the transfer of skills to additional institutions.  This business school in Addis is 
the only graduate-level business school in the country and has a huge demand for it's 
programs.  GBSN is also working with the Faculty of Commerce and Management at 
University of Dar-Es-Salam in Tanzania to ensure a sustainable supply of quality 
managers.  The government of Rwanda has requested the World Bank and IFC to help 
the nation's only business school develop so as to increase the local supply of human 
capital for private sector development.   
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While the emphasis of the GBSN effort is on the quality of education (as it should be), 
we  believe that this activity is attracting high quality students who will constitute an 
important network of business professionals upon graduation.  This network will provide 
competition to existing networks, build trust between its members, improve information 
flows between its members, and enable the enforcement of contracts.   
 
The supply of information and the enforceability of contracts can also be improved by the 
strengthening of the legal and contractual environment.  Recently, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), with the support of the Swiss government’s State Secretariat 
for Economic Affairs (SECO), has announced an innovative project in Tanzania that will 
help firms to acquire finance for the leasing of equipment.  According to the IFC 
brochure, IFC has helped leasing development in 40 countries and has invested $1 billion 
in the leasing sector 50 countries in the last three decades.  The Swiss government has 
been successful in its own leasing program for small and medium sized firms, with regard 
to road projects in Tanzania. 
 
Rather than simply focusing on increasing the supply of money to firms, the IFC-
Tanzania project aims to reform legal, tax and accounting procedures to attract 
investment into the leasing sector.  Targeting firms that have not been able to attract bank 
financing,  including firms that do not have the necessary credit history, IFC argues that 
leasing of equipment will help firms, particular small and medium-sized firms, to grow in 
a sustainable manner.  It also argues that leasing does not require large outlays from 
firms; leasing companies usually require an advance of 10 to 30 percent of the 
equipment’s cost from the lessee.  The ability of the lessee to generate adequate cash flow 
to pay for equipment rentals is usually higher than its ability to purchase the equipment 
outright.  Finally, there is often no need for collateral or security, identified in our 
analysis as a significant constraint, particularly when no information about the firm is 
available.   Overall, the terms of this type of leasing are very favorable to smaller, 
indigenous firms, such as those identified in this analysis. 
 
The IFC project is innovative in that it addresses the leasing issue comprehensively—
most critically, IFC is working on creating favorable legal and economic conditions for 
leasing development in Tanzania.  The project has six critical components—a legislative 
review that will look at current and proposed leasing legislation, capacity building to train 
potential lessors, lessees and other stakeholders, business development to bring together 
SMEs, equipment manufacturers and others, public education to publicize the leasing 
option to the business community, micro-leasing to enable even the smallest firms to 
access this type of finance, and finally, the formation of a leasing association.  The IFC-
Tanzania leasing project has the potential to be replicated elsewhere in sub-Saharan 
Africa, addressing the critical needs of small firms by enabling them to build a reputation, 
and by increasing the supply of information about these firms. 
 
Finally, improving the level of subcontracting between large and small firms may be very 
useful to the learning process.  Subcontracting is often mentioned as a possible path to the 
creation of a larger, more densely populated privates sector.  One successful attempt at 
doing this is the Swiss Development Corporations’ Road Sector Support Programme in   22
Tanzania, which has focused on increasing the supply of information to create linkages 
between firms.  Another promising effort is the World Bank’s Growth Poles project, 
being implemented in Madagascar. Among other things, this project was designed with 
the specific aim of increasing linkages between large and small firms.   
 
There are, of course, several other areas highlighted by the investment climate survey 
data that are in need of governments’ attention—in particular, the creation or 
restructuring of rules surrounding ownership of land,  the reform of judicial, customs and 
tax authorities, in order to provide timely and transparent services.  It is not the case that 
there must simply be “less government,” but rather that governments must be persuaded 
that a broad-based private sector is in their interest.  In some countries in Africa, this type 
of government is emerging and showing strong results; it is crucial that the donor 
community identifies and nurtures these reform efforts. 
 
And finally, is there enough money to facilitate reform?  This is the subject of unending 
debate, but it is worth noting that private sector reform does appear to be at the top of the 
list of both government and donor priorities in many countries in Africa (Doing Business, 
2007).  The newly established Investment Climate Facility is a significant attempt to put 
the private sector at the center of Africa’s growth agenda; its ability to identify and fund 
worthy projects will be tested in the coming years (Moss and Rose, 2006).   
 
In order to alleviate the poverty of millions of people living in sub-Saharan Africa, we 
have no choice but to focus on how to bring the vast majority of Africans into the realm 
of the private sector activity.  A continuous stream of accurate data that reveals the 
specific constraints facing firms in the African private sector is vital to this effort, as is 
the will to carry out much-needed reforms.  
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